When U.S. President Donald Trump declared ahead of his meeting with Xi Jinping that “the G-2 will be convening shortly,” it was more than a casual remark. It was a signal — one that rekindles debates about whether the United States and China are drifting toward a world order defined by two dominant powers. For allies who have long relied on American multilateralism, the idea of a U.S.–China duopoly is both provocative and unsettling.
A Concept with Deep Roots
The notion of a “G-2” is not new. It originated in 2005 when economist C. Fred Bergsten proposed that Washington prioritize strategic bilateral partnerships — particularly with Beijing — to stabilize the global economy and energy markets. The 2008 financial crisis further strengthened the appeal of this model, as cooperation between the world’s two largest economies seemed vital to global recovery and climate action.
Though never meant to replace institutions like the G-20 or the IMF, the G-2 was envisioned as a pragmatic mechanism for “pre-coordination.” During the early Obama years, the U.S. even explored whether structured engagement with China could yield global benefits. But as Beijing’s ambitions grew, the G-2 ideal lost traction — supplanted by concerns over China’s assertiveness and America’s strategic recalibration.
China’s Evolved Posture
In the two decades since, China’s rise has transformed the balance of global power. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has discarded Deng Xiaoping’s cautious dictum to “hide your strength, bide your time.” Instead, it has projected confidence — from building military outposts in the South China Sea to expanding its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative.
This assertiveness prompted Washington to redefine its relationship with Beijing. Trump’s own 2017 National Security Strategy labeled China a “strategic competitor,” ushering in trade wars and tariff barriers. Yet today, his sudden embrace of the G-2 language suggests a possible return to bilateral pragmatism — or perhaps a transactional acknowledgment of China’s indispensability.
The Return of Bilateralism?
For many in Washington’s alliance network, Trump’s G-2 framing feels like déjà vu — a pivot from principled competition to unpredictable deal-making. If the U.S. chooses to negotiate global issues directly with Beijing — on trade, technology, or security — allies could find themselves sidelined. Such an approach would contradict the Indo-Pacific vision built through groupings like the Quad, which champions collective deterrence against unilateralism.
Allies’ Anxiety
India, already navigating trade tensions with Washington, faces renewed uncertainty. The postponement of the Quad Leaders’ Summit and speculation about India’s temporary replacement by the Philippines underscore shifting U.S. priorities. Yet India’s economic and strategic heft makes it indispensable to any sustainable Indo-Pacific framework.
Japan and Australia, too, see risk in any G-2 thaw. Both nations revived the Quad in 2017 precisely to counterbalance Beijing’s regional ambitions. A sudden U.S.–China rapprochement could leave them exposed to policy whiplash.
Meanwhile, ASEAN states welcome reduced great-power tension but fear being marginalized if Washington and Beijing start deciding regional matters bilaterally. For them, autonomy — not alignment — is the goal.
The Global Stakes
A functioning G-2 could, in theory, stabilize global markets and de-escalate military brinkmanship. Joint management of issues like climate change or semiconductor supply chains would benefit all. Yet history warns that duopolies rarely sustain equilibrium for long. Concentrating global decision-making in two capitals risks alienating smaller nations and eroding the legitimacy of multilateral institutions.
Conclusion: Between Pragmatism and Precarity
Trump’s invocation of the G-2 is a reminder that the geometry of global power is never fixed. Whether this marks the return of pragmatic bilateralism or the erosion of inclusive multilateralism will depend on how Washington’s allies — and Beijing’s rivals — respond.
In a world already fragmented by conflict and economic rivalry, the re-emergence of the G-2 idea may offer short-term stability, but it also raises a fundamental question: can two superpowers truly share the steering wheel of the world without pushing everyone else off the road?
Policies & Ideas 